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ABSTRACT 
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) used a Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) 
as an operational guide for monetary policy from 30 June 1997 until 16 March 1999. 
This thesis uses four different methodologies to determine how this affected the 
implementation of monetary policy. The first is a survey that investigates the impact of 
the MCI regime on the way financial market participants viewed the RBNZ's policy 
stance. The second methodology consists of a series of rolling IO-week regressions that 
examines the relationship between short-term interest rates and the exchange rate. The 
third methodology is the autoregressive-distributed lag procedure, which explores the 
links between the RBNZ's policy actions, the MCI and its components, and external 
influences as represented by the United States 90-day bank bill rate. Finally, additional 
information about these relationships is obtained from block Granger causality tests, 
forecast error variance decompositions and impulse-response functions derived from a 
VAR framework . This study draws two major conclusions from the results. First, the 
MCI regime was responsible for an inverse relationship, which developed between the 
two components of the MCI and lasted from June 1997 until November 1998. This 
deepened the recession in 1998 by raising short-term interest rates when the currency 
depreciated after mid-1997. Second, the MCI regime did not significantly change the 
way the RBNZ's policy instruments impacted on the MCI or its components. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The Treasury (1984) argued that inappropriate government interventions were large! y 
responsible for problems besetting the New Zealand economy after the mid-seventies. 
External developments such as the oil price shocks of the 1970s merely exposed long-
standing structural problems that made it hard for the economy to adjust to changing 
economic realities. Many interventions had limited success because they were poorl y 
designed and their objectives conflicted. For example, the wage and price freeze , which 
ended in 1984, reduced inflationary expectations and increased the profitability of 
businesses by reducing real wages but was not supported by appropriate monetary , 
fiscal and exchange rate policies. Government expenditure did not fall in line with tax 
cuts made at its introduction and this caused the nominal money supply to grow 
throughout the freeze and the budget deficit to rise to 9-percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP). 
Many policymakers came to believe that a new style of economic management was 
required. These people gained the ascendancy in government after the foreign exchange 
crisis of July 1984 and introduced a series of far reaching macroeconomic and financial 
reforms that continued until 1 July 1994 when the Fiscal Responsibility Act came into 
force. Dalziel and Lattimore (1999) describe this programme, which included the 
deregulation of financial markets, floating of the New Zealand dollar, privatisation, 
corporatisation of government trading departments, removal of producer subsidies , and 
deregulation of the labour market under the Employment Contracts Act (ECA). These 
were radical changes and it often took many years before their benefits became 
apparent. For example, economic growth, which reached 7-percent in 1984, remained 
below 2-percent for almost the entire period from December 1985 to June 1993, while 
unemployment rose to nearly IO-percent over the same interval (ibid., pp. 96-97). 
The reform of monetary policy was critical to the success of this programme and was 
given a legislative basis by The Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989 (RBNZA-89). 
The RBNZA-89 put inflation-targeting theory into practice by making price stability the 
sole objective of monetary policy and giving the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
(RBNZ) autonomy in choosing the best means of achieving and maintaining it. In a 
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broader context, the RBNZA-89 was part of a move by many western governments 
away from demand management policies and towards a more hands-off style of 
economic management. The influence of the natural-rate hypothesis advanced by 
Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968) can be seen behind this process and hence behind 
the RBNZA-89. Friedman and Phelps argued that nominal variables, such as the money 
supply, have no permanent effect on real variables and so there is no long-run trade-off 
between unemployment and inflation . This implies that every economy has its own 
long-run equilibrium, which is largely insensitive to monetary policy induced shifts in 
aggregate demand. 
The RBNZA-89 required monetary policy to be conducted transparently in order to 
increase credibility and reduce risk premiums. In line with this, the RBNZ used a 
Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) as an operational guide from 30 June 1997 until 16 
March 1999 in an effort to improve the communication of its monetary policy stance to 
financial markets. The RBNZ thus became one of only four central banks to publish an 
MCI. The Bank of Canada (BC) used its MCI as an operational target in a similar 
manner to the RBNZ, whereas the central banks of Norway and Sweden used their 
MCis only as indicators of monetary conditions when formulating policy. 
The New Zealand MCI is calculated as the weighted sum of the 90-day bank bill rate 
(NZ90) and the Trade Weighted Index (TWI), and so can be used as a rough measure of 
the overall ease or tightness of monetary conditions. The MCI regime had many critics 
who claimed that it not only failed in its objectives but may also have exacerbated the 
very problems it was meant to solve (Bennett, 1999; Edlin, 1997; Grimmond, 1998). 
This thesis used four methodologies to investigate the impact of the MCI regime on the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. The first was a survey, which was given to the chief 
economists of six New Zealand banks in order to find out how the MCI regime affected 
their perceptions of the RBNZ's monetary policy stance. The second methodology 
consisted of a series of rolling 10-week regressions. It was used to determine if an 
inverse relationship existed between changes in the NZ90 and the value of the New 
Zealand dollar in American cents (FX) on a regular basis or was confined to periods 
associated with readily identifiable portfolio shocks. A systematic negative relationship 
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would suggest that the MCI hindered policy implementation 1• An identical study was 
conducted with Australian data in order to provide a comparative analysis . The third 
methodology was the autoregressive-distributed lag (ARDL) technique. It was used to 
obtain information about how the MCI and its two components were affected by RBNZ 
policy actions and external influences as represented by the United States 90-day bank 
bill rate (US90) . Finally, block Granger causality tests, impulse-response (IR) functions 
and forecast error variance (FEV) decompositions were obtained from a vector 
autoregression (VAR) framework. They yielded additional information about how the 
RBNZ's policy instruments influenced the NZ90 and FX. 
Results obtained from these methodologies suggest that the MCI regime failed to 
improve the implementation of monetary policy and caused a systematic inverse 
relationship to develop between short-term interest rates and the exchange rate. This 
deepened the recession in 1998 by raising interest rates when the exchange rate 
depreciated after mid-1997. The study also finds that the MCI regime did not 
significantly change the way the RBNZ's policy instruments affected the MCI or its 
components. The RBNZ was unable to set the desired value of the MCI on a daily basis 
and its policy instruments had no significant long-term influence on interest rates or the 
exchange rate, in fact they appear to have been more useful in smoothing out daily 
fluctuations in money markets. 
The balance of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter two reviews the theoretical 
basis and empirical development of the MCI, and summarises its use by central banks 
and financial institutions around the world. Chapter three describes the recent history of 
monetary policy in New Zealand with special emphasis on the MCI regime. Chapter 
four describes the methodologies and data used in this study. Chapter five presents the 
empirical results and chapter six summarises the main conclusions of this thesis. Five 
appendices and a list of references follow. Appendices 1 and 2 contain those sections of 
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1964 (RBNZA-64) and the RBNZA-89 that 
relate to the conduct of monetary policy. Appendix 3 contains a copy of the survey 
used in this study. Appendix 4 describes the operation of monetary policy in Australia 
and Appendix 5 describes the dummy variables used in the ARDL analysis. 
1 This inverse relationship is explained in greater detail in section 4.2. 
